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Abstract 
 
The paper first discusses alternative theoretical frameworks to analyse the impacts of FDI on 
host economies. Second, it provides an overview of major developments in the Hungarian 
automotive industry since the early 1990s, discussing both firm strategies and the macro level 
factors influencing the former ones, especially by highlighting the consequences of Hungary’s 
accession to the EU. A tentative taxonomy has also been developed, and applied when 
discussing the prospects for Hungarian suppliers. The paper concludes that diffusion models 
and the notion of sectoral system of innovation and production offer a more appropriate 
conceptual framework to capture the actual socio-economic impacts of FDI in this sector than 
the generally used spillover models. Notwithstanding the huge importance of globalisation, 
various elements and dynamics of national innovation systems still do matter. As for a major 
element of an NIS, namely government policies, it is more fruitful to create an attractive, 
favourable environment for R&D and innovation than focusing on the promotion of industry-
specific R&D and innovation activities. It is also of crucial importance to co-ordinate several 
policies to enhance competitiveness. 
 
 
Keywords: automotive production and innovation systems; Hungary; motivations for, and 
impacts of, FDI 
 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
Foreign-owned firms have already achieved a significant weight by the mid-1990s in the 
Hungarian economy for two reasons. First, privatisation techniques favoured genuine owners, 
who could afford to inject fresh capital – as opposed to the so-called voucher schemes, 
applied in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – and these new funds were 
only available abroad. Second, investment promotion policies – e.g. tax holidays, 
infrastructure and human resource development projects largely financed by public money – 
also attracted foreign investors. The share of foreign-owned firms has become extremely high 
compared to OECD member states: their share in total manufacturing revenues was 71.6% in 
2002, surpassed only by Ireland (79.5% in 2001) among the OECD countries. Just to indicate 
how extreme these two countries were in this respect, Belgium, with a much lower share of 
‘only’ 57.2% (2002), ranked 3 on this list. The only other country above the 50% mark was 
Canada (51.0% in 2002).2 There was only a single country in the range of 41-50%, namely 
the Czech Republic (45.5% in 2002); while five countries registered a share of foreign-owned 
firms above 30% by 1999-2002: France, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the UK (in 
alphabetical order). (OECD STI Scoreboard 2005, Table E.6, p. 202) 
The amount of foreign capital invested in Hungary also indicates the significant role of 
foreign-owned companies: FDI amounted to €3.3 billion in 2004, and 2005 saw an even 
larger inflow of capital, that is, €5.3 bn. In absolute terms, Hungary was second only to 
Poland concerning cumulated FDI inflow: $61.2 bn vs. $93.3 bn by 2005. (UNCTAD) Thus, 
FDI stock per capita was $6,122 in Hungary in 2005, ranked between Estonia: $9441.5; and 
the Czech Republic: $5829. (own calculation based on UNCTAD data). Thus, globalisation 
has become a key issue both for economists and policy-makers in Hungary. 
An important strand of literature has long focussed on the motivations of investors. The 
most widely accepted concept, the so-called eclectic paradigm, developed by Dunning, is 
distinguishing market-, resource-, efficiency- and competence-seeking investment projects. 
More recently, it has become an equally important research question to assess the impacts of 
FDI on local firms. To what extent and through what channels are foreign-owned companies 
contributing to the re-structuring of the domestic industries? Do they enhance the 
competitiveness of indigenous firms by bringing technological and organisational innovations 
in, or do they have a negative effect, e.g. by forcing some of the domestic firms to exit? 
Given the extremely high weight of foreign capital in Hungary, these research questions 
are of high importance, and automotive industry offers an excellent opportunity to tackle 
them. This industry has traditionally been a front-runner in globalising its activities, 
originally in the forms of trade and licensing agreements, as early as the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and then in the form of cross-border investment projects. The main drivers 
for the major automotive firms are cutting costs via re-location of production, and gaining 
access to new markets in emerging economies. They have become quite active in Central 
Europe, too: practically all major automotive groups, both assemblers and component 
manufacturers, have already set up their operations in Central Europe, or are building their 
new plants. (Havas, 2000a, 2004; Pavlinek 2002a, 2002b, 2005) Given these strategic moves, 
the Hungarian automotive industry has been radically re-shaped: car production started again 
in Hungary in the early 1990s – after a half-a-century ‘recess’ –, and suppliers became parts 
of the global production networks, either via ownership or subcontracting relationships. In 
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brief, new products are manufactured by new entrants or fundamentally transformed 
incumbent firms, using new production and management techniques, and serving new 
customers. 
The aim of this paper is to shed some light on this sweeping re-structuring process, 
focusing (i) on the role and impacts of production networks, co-ordinated by major foreign 
firms; (ii) on prospects and modes of growth; and (iii) on the scope for innovation policy. It is 
based on interviews with managers, both at foreign-owned and domestic firms, and simple 
sectoral statistical analyses. The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. 
Section 2 discusses alternative theoretical frameworks to analyse the impacts of foreign-
owned companies on domestic ones, namely spillover vs. diffusion models, as well a new 
concept of the evolutionary economics of innovation, that is, sectoral system of innovation 
and production. (Malerba, 2002, 2005) Analysing historical trends can help in achieving a 
better understanding of current developments. Therefore, Sections 3-5 summarise the 
evolution of the automobile and auto parts industries in Hungary, as well as major 
developments since the late 1980s. Competition patterns and the role of production networks 
are then discussed in Section 6. The following section shifts the focus of analysis from the 
present to the future by looking at the different modes of growth and the prospects for the 
Hungarian suppliers. Finally, theoretical and policy conclusions are drawn in Section 8. 
 
 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The paper is not aimed at developing new theories: it applies existing theoretical frameworks 
with the intention to demonstrate their crucial differences. These contrasting frameworks, 
therefore, are only characterised here very briefly. 
The ‘pyramid’ of the automotive industry has become a universally accepted model to 
describe the interactions among vehicle assemblers and first-, second- and third-tier (T1, T2, 
T3) suppliers. (Bongardt, 1992; Freyssenet et al. (eds.) 2000; Jones, 1989, 1999; Ruigrok et 
al., 1991; Sturgeon and Florida, 2000; Vickery, 1996; Womack et al., 1991)3 Two basic 
features of the industry can be stressed: (i) firms are bound to co-operate, and thus the 
appropriate unit of analysis is their networks in many cases, i.e. not individual firms; and (ii) 
these co-operations are often cross-border ones. These two features are captured by the 
concept of global production networks. In sum, this model seems an appropriate basis – or 
broader framework – when analysing the motivations for FDI, both by assemblers and T1 
suppliers, as well as the effects of foreign firms on endogenous ones. 
Spillover models are probably the most frequently used analytical tools to discuss the 
impacts of FDI on the host economy. Spillover, strictly defined, means unintended ‘leakage’ 
of various types of business practices and knowledge. From a different angle, the 
‘beneficiary’ firm does not pay anything for the ‘leaked’ methods, information or knowledge 
– just use them, and thus we speak of non-pecuniary relationships in these cases. A clear 
policy implication of this conceptual framework is that spillover should be stopped, i.e. 
governments should put in place a tight enough regulation to protect intellectual property 
rights (IPR) of firms – in this specific context, IPR of foreign firms. 
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Abundant evidence shows, however, the ‘sticky’, localised nature of knowledge; 
especially that of tacit knowledge.4 Innovation studies have also confirmed the importance of 
tacit knowledge and learning – including learning capabilities – in successful innovation 
processes. Further, any new pieces of knowledge – on ‘its own’, or embodied in product or 
process innovations – can only be exploited if adapted to the needs and circumstances of a 
given firm, introducing these innovations. (Dosi, 1988a, 1988b; Lundvall and Borrás, 1999) 
In other words, firms can only benefit from knowledge or ‘technological spillovers’ when 
they invest in learning and innovation (developing learning capabilities and innovation skills, 
etc.). Paraphrasing a widely used ‘motto’ of mainstream economic, there is no ‘free lunch’ in 
this respect, either. Thus, even at the highest level of abstraction – disregarding sector 
specific features –, the use of spillover as a basic concept for policy conclusions (i.e. trying to 
stop spillover) is misleading. (Langlois and Robertson, 2006) 
It is even more worrisome that in many cases this term is used in a rather vague 
fashion, covering all types of linkages among firms, not only to denote unintended ‘leakages’. 
Then the problems stemming from a ‘loose’ use of the term for policy conclusions can be 
even more severe. 
Considering the automotive industry, the use of spillover models is even more 
questionable for several reasons. First, in this case it is highly relevant to make a distinction 
between the different directions of buyer-supplier relationships in terms of impacts. Just to 
illustrate, it is worth recalling the case of Magyar Suzuki. The original, mainly Japanese, 
suppliers of Suzuki have been strongly encouraged by Suzuki to ship certain parts and sub-
systems to the new Hungarian (and other Central European) suppliers of Suzuki, and also to 
‘nurture’ them by making available various organisational and managerial innovations. In 
these cases suppliers have major impacts on buyers, who are actually also suppliers, but in a 
different relationship. In those other relationships the buyer, namely Magyar Suzuki, has 
significant effects on its suppliers through its exacting demand, as well as the various types 
and forms of technical assistance it is offering to the new CEE suppliers. In brief, the 
suppliers must improve their performance by introducing new products, processes, as well as 
non-technological innovations. 
Second there seems to be a contradiction between the general findings of the spillover 
literature and the sectoral characteristics of automotive industry. A survey of the spillover 
literature analysing the impacts of FDI in the top 10 transition economies suggests limited or 
negative intra-industry (horizontal) spillover and positive, significant inter-industry (vertical) 
spillover. (Damijan et al., 1993) A widely held consensus among the analysts of automotive 
industry is just the opposite: there are major intra-industry impacts stemming from inter-firm 
relationships. (Bongardt, 1992, Jones, 1989, 1999; Lamming, 1993; Sako, 1997, 1998; Sako 
and Helper, 1998; Sako et al., 1995; Sturgeon and Florida, 2000; Vickery, 1996; Womack et 
al., 1991) Actually, given the composition of automotive production systems it is far from a 
trivial task to establish what intra-industry and inter-industry relationships are: practically all 
industries are suppliers of vehicle assemblers, and thus firms of several sectors (producing 
metal, plastic, rubber, glass, chemicals, leather, electric or electronic parts and sub-systems) 
belong to a given automotive production system. 
Third, even the very notion of spillover is highly questionable in the context of 
automotive production networks, characterised by close co-operation, collective learning, and 
thus shared knowledge. 
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For the above reasons, alternative, more appropriate, theoretical frameworks are needed 
to support the analysis of the impacts of foreign investors on indigenous automotive firms. 
There are two promising, complementary candidates for this task, namely diffusion models 
and sectoral systems of innovation and production. The remaining parts of this section briefly 
introduce these concepts. 
Diffusion models – as opposed to the strict sense of spillovers – include all sorts of 
dissemination of technological and organisational innovations, both intended and unintended. 
From a different angle, pecuniary relationships (e.g. licensing agreements), as well as other 
forms/ channels of diffusion (e.g. any sort of technological co-operation among firms 
belonging to a consortium or production networks, etc.) are covered by these models. (Dosi, 
1992; Lissoni and Metcalfe, 1994; Metcalfe, 1988, 1990) 
The notion of sectoral systems of innovation and production has been developed by 
Malerba (2002), and defined as follows: “a sectoral system of innovation and production is a 
set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market 
and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products. Sectoral 
systems have a knowledge base, technologies, inputs and demand. The agents are individuals 
and organizations at various levels of aggregation, with specific learning processes, 
competencies, organizational structure, beliefs, objectives and behaviors. They interact 
through processes of communication, exchange, co-operation, competition and command, 
and their interactions are shaped by institutions. A sectoral system undergoes processes of 
change and transformation through the co-evolution of its various elements.” (p. 248) 
Although a full treatment of the Hungarian automotive innovation and production 
system cannot be provided here, the underlying principles of this theoretical framework are 
followed below when discussing the fundamental re-structuring of this sector, as well as its 
prospects. 
 
 
3. TRADITIONS OF THE HUNGARIAN CAR AND CAR COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES 
3.1. Craft Production before 1945 
Cars, first assembled from imported kits, have been produced in Hungary since 1903. 1905 
saw the first car designed and built by a Hungarian engineer, János Csonka. Bus 
manufacturing started in 1909. Preparation for World War I sparked production of cars, 
lorries, and engines. Ravages of war and The Great Depression hindered the sector in the 
1920s. Recovery started in the 1930s, including the assembly of Ford models under a licence 
agreement. Motorcycle production commenced in the 1930s, too. First imported kits were 
assembled but local content had increased to ninety per cent by 1935. World War II boosted 
production again, particularly for military vehicles. (Berend and Ránki, 1955, 1958) All the 
major car parts – engines, gears, and chassis – had also been produced in Hungary until the 
mid-1940s. In other words, Hungary’s vehicle manufacturers have not been mere assembly 
units of foreign companies, but have accumulated skills in automotive engineering, building 
upon a long tradition in mechanical engineering. 
Hungarian engineers were rather successful in R&D in the pioneering period of the 
industry. The most notable ones were János Csonka and Donát Bánki who substantially 
improved the internal combustion engine in many ways in the 1880s and 1890s. Their most 
significant – but hardly acknowledged – achievement was the invention of the carburettor in 
1893. Bánki also designed a new engine that raised efficiency fifty percent. These R&D 
results, however, were not commercialised in a large scale production in Hungary. Not even 
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the carburettor, what was re-invented by Maybach in Germany two years later, and that 
version became known all over the world. 
 
3.2. Heritage of the CMEA 
Automotive production facilities were ruined during the war. Manufacturing of motorcycles, 
buses, lorries, and other commercial vehicles resumed after the war.5 Car production, 
however, was abandoned under a new industrial policy, which shaped Hungary’s industrial 
structure to a CMEA-wide division of labour. The new policy first was influenced informally 
by Soviet advisors working in Hungary and then by a formal Soviet-Hungarian specialisation 
agreement signed in 1964. The accord co-ordinated the two countries’ industrial development 
projects, including automotive manufacturing, in the wider context of CMEA. It also 
stipulated that Hungary would specialise in producing buses for the entire CMEA.6 Ikarus, 
Hungary’s bus manufacturing firm became one of the largest in Europe, turning out some 
14,000 units a year in the 1980s.7 
Bus manufacturing provided an excellent opportunity to make use of the considerable 
assets and skills accumulated in car components manufacturing companies, in spite of the 
lack of car manufacturing since the late 1940s. Hungarian suppliers also shipped car parts to 
other CMEA countries since the 1960s.8 Certain automotive components, e.g. engines, axles, 
undercarriages and tyres for commercial vehicles as well as bulbs, batteries and dash boards 
for cars, were also exported for hard currencies (to Western Europe, the US and India). 
As for R&D, hardly any original project was conducted in this period in a sharp 
contrast with the pre-war era. The pace of technological improvement was set by CMEA 
demand. Needless to stress how different these requirements were compared to those of 
advanced countries, given the severe shortage of cars and the lack of rigorous safety and 
environmental regulations. The only counterbalancing factor was that CMEA car 
manufacturers, expect Skoda, based their product development strategy on Western licences 
since the 1960s. Hence, their suppliers’ products were also based on Western licences. The 
most advanced product and process technologies, however, were not made available through 
these licence agreements. In other words, it was a ‘safe’ way to maintain or even widen the 
technological gap. In fact, due to the lack of incentives to innovate – that is, no import 
competition at all, extremely long queues for effectively rationed cars, lack of up-to-date 
safety and environmental rules – CMEA car producers were happy in the 1980s with their 30-
40-year old technologies. Their Hungarian suppliers, therefore, had hardly any opportunity 
and incentives to innovate, either. Those suppliers, however, that exported their products for 
hard currencies had no other choice than to continuously improve their products through up-
to-date Western licences (e.g. from Bosch, MAN, KNORR, ZF, Girling, Lucas) and adaptive 
in-house R&D projects. 
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4. RE-EMERGING CAR PRODUCTION IN HUNGARY 
4.1. A policy dilemma 
Hungarian government officials had long intended to re-establish car industry for two basic 
reasons. First, the severe shortage of cars was rather annoying in this reformed planned 
economy – often referred to as ‘goulash communism’ in Western media. This shortage 
resulted in an ageing, obsolete car population. (Havas, 1997) Second, the government also 
viewed car manufacturing as a means of industrial modernisation, with its exacting technical 
and organisational requirements. Industrialists also backed the idea as a major step toward 
integration into the world economy – and as another golden opportunity to obtain big slices 
of investment funds from the government. Eventually, two consortia were set up by 
Hungarian companies to promote the re-establishment of car industry in the late 1980s. 
One question has, however, divided this apparently unified camp of promoters, namely 
whether to opt for large scale manufacturing of components for major car producers or to 
assemble cars again, after a rather long interval, lasting for almost 50 years.9 It was also an 
open and much debated question whether to try to mount assembly operations within the 
framework of the CMEA, or in co-operation with the advanced countries. While the 
government pondered the issue, two foreign car companies – Suzuki and GM Opel – looking 
for favourable new locations and market opportunities, ‘resurrected’ the Hungarian car 
manufacturing in the early 1990s. 
 
 
4.2. Magyar Suzuki 
Magyar Suzuki, a Japanese-Hungarian joint venture located in Esztergom, some 50 km of 
Budapest, commenced commercial production of compact cars in October 1992. Investment 
has totalled $260 million by 1997. Then a further $146 million has been invested to produce a 
new small car, jointly developed with GM, but assembled separately under Suzuki and Opel 
badges in Esztergom and Gliwice, Poland, respectively. The Suzuki version is called Wagon 
R+, and its production is commenced in January 2000. The other new model, called Ignis, 
was introduced in April 2003. It also means that output will reach 100 thousand units a year. 
Diesel engines were also added to the product lines in November 2003. 
Magyar Suzuki has constantly increased its output, employment and productivity, but 
was in the black for only 5 years since 1993, and even its 2002 profits were still somewhat 
modest. 2003, however, saw a significant improvement: pre-tax profits reached almost 10% 
of revenues. (Table 1) That was the sixth biggest improvement in that year, putting Magyar 
Suzuki at the rank of 19 in the list of companies by the size of pre-tax profit.10 Soon it became 
one of the top exporting companies in Hungary (ranked seventh in 1997, eleventh in 2000, 
twelfth in both 2002 and 2003, and seventh again in 2004). 
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 The company making the largest amount of pre-tax profit is not necessarily the most profitable one in terms of 
return on investment (or any other relative measure). 
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Table 1: Major data of Magyar Suzuki, 1992-2004 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Domestic sales (units) 929 12,659 16,065 12,178 13,594 16,039 23,788 30,800 28,100 29,019 36,200 39,750 33,854 
Exports (units) –    – 3,309 23,873 38,183 47,700 42,001 35,600 49,600 56,171 49,200 50,200 66,438 
Revenues (m HUF) 1,907 9,338 15,468 36,831 56,777 77,035 87,152 91,614 126,017 148,341 148,714 183,159 222,313 
  Domestic sales (m HUF) 1,903 9,272 13,098 13,333 15,652 19,117 31,867 43,026 41,359 49,329 63,661 79,574 77,318 
  Exports (m HUF) 4 66 2,370 23,498 41,125 57,918 55,285 48,588 84,658 99,012 85,053 103,585 144,995 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) .. -6,840 -2,046 -351 887 1,651 16 -1,048 -5,853 -809 4,521 9,894 7,683 
Employment (average, heads) 279 487 652 1,032 1,417 1,547 1,528 1,374 1,592 1,784 1,634 1,935 2,443 
Source: Magyar Suzuki and press reports 
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The company aims at substantially increasing its market share in Europe, and hence 10 
new models are to be introduced until 2007, though only two of them are produced in 
Esztergom. The first one has replaced the Swift model family. The second one is a new mini 
SUV, developed jointly with another member of the GM group at that time, namely Fiat. 
Following the example set by Wagon R+, the almost identical versions will be marketed 
wearing different badges: some 40 thousand units as Suzuki make, while around 20 thousand 
ones as Fiat models. To add these new cars to the current product lines, some $100 million 
has been invested at the Esztergom plant, doubling the capacity to 200,000 units a year. The 
pressing and welding plants are to be extended, and a new, water-based painting facility is to 
be added. Employment will be increased by 400 workers. 
 
Supplier relationships 
Supplier relationships, the overall performance of Magyar Suzuki and the broader 
institutional framework have always been closely related issues since the very beginning. 
Obviously, a major source of performance improvement is economies of scale, and the only 
way to achieve that is exporting cars to the European Union as the Hungarian market is 
simply too small to accommodate a large enough production run. The EU, in turn, requires a 
60 per cent ‘local’, i.e. EU content. Otherwise, prohibitive tariffs are charged on cars shipped 
by non-EU firms. Thus, as Hungary only joined the EU in May 2004, Magyar Suzuki had to 
reach 60 per cent EU content in order to export it cars to EU markets. Moreover, it bought 
certain parts from its local suppliers in relatively low volumes – initially it only produced 
30,000-40,000 cars a year – but followed a single-sourcing strategy. Therefore, it had very 
strong incentives to ‘nurture’ a local supply base in the beginning. With Hungary’s accession 
to the EU, however, it has fundamentally changed, and accordingly Magyar Suzuki’s supplier 
strategy has been revised. 
In the first period, up until the 60 per cent EU content had been reached, Magyar 
Suzuki had made special efforts to find viable suppliers and improve their performance. 
Together with its Japanese suppliers, it had conducted a thorough technological and financial 
audit, covering literally every single aspect of doing business from purchasing inputs through 
production methods and machinery, to accounting, sales and management, broadly defined. 
Then joint efforts had also been made to improve the selected supplier’s technical level and 
economic performance, when needed. 
Pressing, welding, painting and assembly account for around 20-22 per cent of a Suzuki 
Swift’s value and carried out by Magyar Suzuki itself.11 Local content, including the above 
in-house activities, was only 25 per cent in October 1992, but it almost doubled (48 per cent) 
by the end of 1993 given an extensive and rapid localisation programme. Since then 
localisation has continued at a much slower pace, reaching 53 per cent by 1997.12 Magyar 
Suzuki intends to keep importing the more advanced components, such as engine, 
transmission and undercarriage, from Japan. As these sub-systems account for around 20 per 
cent of value-added, the theoretical maximum of local content is 80 per. 
Originally it seemed unlikely that Hungarian suppliers could export their products to 
the Japanese plants of Suzuki Motor Corp., given the significant lag in productivity and 
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substantial transportation costs, let alone the then shrinking demand for new cars in Japan. 
Yet, the joint endeavours of Magyar Suzuki and its Hungarian suppliers resulted in a 
breakthrough in a few years: exports of rubber and plastic parts to Japan started in late 1994, 
while springs have been shipped since October 1995. Eight Hungarian suppliers were 
involved in these activities in 1995, and 3 others joined this ‘club’ in 1996. 
In this period, Magyar Suzuki developed a detailed statistical system to monitor the 
process of reaching the required 60 per cent of EU content. (Table 2) 
 
Table 2: Distribution of value added at Magyar Suzuki, 1992-1998 (per cent) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
(1) Magyar Suzuki  19 23 23 23 24 24 24 
(2) Hungarian suppliers 6 25 27 28 29 29 29 
(3) Local content (1+2) 25 48 50 51 53 53 53 
(4) EU suppliers* 4 11 12 14 17 17 17 
(5) EU content (3+4) 29 59 62 65 70 70 70 
(6) Japanese suppliers 71 41 38 35 30 30 30 
(7) Total (5+6) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Magyar Suzuki 
* Including associate members of the EU 
In brief, Magyar Suzuki had played a substantial role in diffusing new products, 
production processes, as well as managerial and organisational innovations among its 
Hungarian suppliers. This should be regarded as a significant contribution to overcome the 
legacy of the planned economy period in terms of upgrading the technological level of 
domestic suppliers and improving their performance by introducing new management 
techniques and learning new types of behaviour, required by the rules of market economy. 
The second phase of Magyar Suzuki’s supplier strategy started at the end of the 1990s, 
when the EU content has been stabilised well above the 60 per cent level required for 
customs-free exports to EU markets. Since then, no special efforts have been made to 
‘nurture’ the domestic suppliers. Those firms, which have been unable to improve their 
performance, i.e. stuck at the level of merely assembling parts imported from Japan, in spite 
of the sustained technical – and sometimes financial – assistance of Magyar Suzuki and its 
Japanese suppliers, provided for many years since the early 1990s, are not awarded any new 
businesses because they proved unable to develop. Some 10 Hungarian suppliers have had 
this fate. Those ones that have improved their capabilities – often by investing in new 
machinery and sometimes in new buildings, too, and thus enhanced their competitiveness – 
retained their position as suppliers. 
In this phase, no statistics are available on the distribution of value added at Magyar 
Suzuki. Only the number of suppliers can be compared in the two distinct stages of the 
company’s supplier strategy. Magyar Suzuki had 34 suppliers based in Hungary in 1995, 41 
in 1996 and 45 in 1998. A further 35 suppliers shipped various parts to Magyar Suzuki in 
1996 from EU countries, and 3 ones – all partly or wholly foreign owned – from Central and 
Eastern European countries. In 2003, 320 suppliers provided either products or services for 
Magyar Suzuki, of which 66 were operating in Hungary. As no ownership data are kept 
concerning the suppliers, it is only an estimate that some 40-50 of these 66 firms are owned 
by domestic investors. As for other Central European countries, around 30 Polish, 20 Czech, 
5 Slovak and 4-5 Slovene suppliers have businesses with Magyar Suzuki. 
It is simply not possible to keep such intense relationships with 320 suppliers as 
Magyar Suzuki had to do when it was aiming at achieving the 60 per cent EU content as 
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quickly as possible. In the current phase, the most they offer is to facilitate liaising with 
Japanese suppliers for those indigenous or other Central European suppliers that want to 
develop their competences by co-operating with the long-established suppliers of Suzuki 
Motor Corp. Another form of a ‘reserved’ assistance is organising study tours to visit the 
plants of Japanese suppliers. Every other year 10 Hungarian suppliers can benefit from this 
exchange programme, co-financed by Magyar Suzuki itself, ITD Hungary13 and the 
participating Hungarian firms. 
The suppliers for one of the new models had already been selected by 2003 as 
production commenced in 2004. As for the jointly developed mini SUV, introduced in 2005, 
the selection process was also underway already in 2003. Whenever a new model is added to 
the product lines, all suppliers have to bid, even those with whom Magyar Suzuki has had 
long-established relationships. Experience suggests, however, that some 80 per cent of 
suppliers can keep businesses after a model change. 
The new Swift model is produced at several plants besides Esztergom, and thus 
suppliers should be able to produce in relatively large runs, as well as shipping their parts to 
different locations. Similar demand had to be met by those suppliers who have been involved 
in the Wagon R+ project.14 Some 80 per cent of the parts of the two versions (Opel and 
Suzuki) of this car are shared, and thus GM Opel and Magyar Suzuki selected together the 
suppliers. In that case, the purchasing departments of Magyar Suzuki and Opel Hungary (see 
the next sub-section) were closely co-operating. As GM has a 20 per cent stake in Suzuki 
Motor Corp, the parent company of Magyar Suzuki, in principle this sort of co-operation can 
be an every day practice between the two Hungarian affiliates of the (extended) GM group. 
This would be rather advantageous for their suppliers: having become e.g. a Magyar Suzuki 
supplier would mean to get access to the Opel market, and thus much larger, supposedly 
more profitable production runs. However, the Wagon R+ (Agila) project has been a one-off 
co-operation between these two purchasing departments of the GM group operating in 
Hungary. 
Following the general industrial practice, T1 suppliers of Suzuki Motor Corp are 
participating in developing the components and sub-systems of new models. None of the 
Hungarian suppliers have reached that level, and it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable 
future. Simply it would be too big a jump to close the gap between themselves and the 
established T1 suppliers, such as Bosch, Denso, Delco, Temich and the like, in terms of 
financial muscles, technological competences and organising capabilities so as to co-ordinate 
T2 and T3 suppliers’ activities, providing support to improve their quality assurance and 
logistics systems, etc. 
The Hungarian suppliers are not mere screw-driving plants, either, as already 
mentioned. Besides production capabilities, they have had to accumulate important 
technological competences, too: they have to be able to make the final drawings of 
components, relying on a so-called surface design provided by Magyar Suzuki, as well to 
design dedicated tools and the overall production process. Usually the simple tools are 
produced by the suppliers themselves, while the more complicated ones are made by 
specialised firms. It is an exception, rather then a rule, when Magyar Suzuki provides the 
tools, e.g. in case of last minute design changes. 
                                                 
13
 ITD is an investment and trade development agency of the Hungarian government, under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Economy and Transport. 
14
 As already mentioned, that model had been developed jointly with another part of the GM group, namely 
Opel, and produced both in Poland (Gliwice) as Opel Agila and Hungary. 
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A potential channel of spillover for a supplier could be to poach Magyar Suzuki 
employees, e.g. engineers either from the production or purchasing department. It has not 
happened since the early 1990s, although around a dozen engineers have left the Esztergom 
plant. None of them, however, has joined any Magyar Suzuki supplier: instead, they work in 
different industries or for automotive firms with no links with Magyar Suzuki. In any event, 
Magyar Suzuki would take it as a rather ‘unfriendly’ move, and most likely would stop doing 
business with such a supplier as that firm could gain sensitive (‘insider’) information on 
Magyar Suzuki practices and procedures. 
To sum up, Magyar Suzuki has provided its Hungarian and other Central European 
suppliers with various sorts of technological and managerial knowledge (know-how) on 
purpose, as it did need to ‘nurture’ a local supply base to reach the required 60 per cent EU 
content as quickly as possible. To achieve this goal, it was inevitable to develop close co-
operation with the selected suppliers, previously accustomed to the standards and norms of 
the planned economy, in order to ‘drive’ them into a different system, namely market 
economy. Not all ‘students’ have completed this on-the job training successfully, but most of 
them have adjusted to the new requirements, and now are able to meet the exacting demand 
in terms of technological level, timely delivery, and efficient, profitable conduct of business. 
In that sense Magyar Suzuki has significantly contributed to the diffusion of new products, 
production processes as well as managerial and organisational innovations, i.e. to develop 
suppliers’ capabilities. Once the 60 per cent EU content had been achieved, Magyar Suzuki 
has not had strong incentives any more to continue this supplier strategy. Since then, it has 
made far less significant efforts to develop its local supply base. The current assistance, 
however, is still not negligible. In short, the diffusion of technological and organisational 
innovations among Hungarian and Central European firms has been promoted actively and on 
purpose by Magyar Suzuki, while spillover effects, strictly defined, seem to be insignificant. 
 
 
4.3. Opel Hungary 
Opel Hungary Vehicle Manufacturing Ltd. opened the other Hungarian car assembly plant 
and an engine factory in a customs-free zone at Szentgotthárd, close to the Austrian border, in 
1992, too. Initially GM Opel had invested over DM400 million. Opel Astras were produced 
in Hungary until December 1998. Parts purchased in Hungary initially accounted for merely 
4 per cent of an Astra’s value, then 9.6 per cent in 1995-1998. 
As for the engine factory, its original capacity had been doubled to 460,000 units a year 
(i.e. around one-fourth of the total European production of Opel), and cylinder heads had also 
been added to the product lines due to further investment projects completed by 1996, worth 
of DM47 million, and DM210 million, respectively. Actual output primarily depends on 
demand for Opel models in Western Europe as the vast majority of production had been 
exported to Opel assembly plants even in until 1998 (when cars were assembled in 
Szentgotthárd), and 100% is exported since then. Due to these secure markets, Opel Hungary 
was in the black already in the second year of its operation. (Table 3) It made the third largest 
profits in Hungary in 1997, and was the fourth largest exporter. These results were repeated 
in the following years, too: the fourth largest profits before taxation in 2000, and still the 
sixth largest exporting company, in spite of a slight decrease. Its ranking in 2002 was fifteen 
and seven, while in 2003 sixteen and six, respectively. 
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Table 3: Major data of Opel Hungary Powertrain, 1992-2004 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Car production (units) 9,401 13,344 12,282 12,488 11,255 12,700 9,700 – – – – – – 
Car exports (units) 2,736 3,220 2,254 3,956 2,480 2,736 1,208 – – – – – – 
Engines (units) 20,511 75,741 160,033 266,051 310,034 368,000 417,000 511,813 480,030 399,945 417,905 .. 456,199 
Gearboxes, Allison (units) – – – – – – – – 317 6215 9,939 .. 10,354 
Gearboxes, CVT (units) – – – – – – – – – – 26,140 .. .. 
Revenues (m €) 89 178 302 542 557 660 717 751 671 564 664 .. .. 
Revenues  (m HUF)           148,108 167,404 140,283 
Exports (m HUF) 1,691 8,402 29,151 90,178 99,761 121,832 168,248 189,088 177,298 147,306 148,108 167,404 140,283 
Employment, Opel Hungary 528 495 666 778 933 1,203 1,104 1,024 956 831 822 844 814 
Outsourced employment 164 181 195 227 281 332 351 340 445 444 440 .. .. 
Value added (m HUF) -705 2,971 9,470 19,277 30,289 44,607        
Value added (m €)       233 312 313 339 316 .. .. 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) -1,343 736 6,095 14,584 20,691 32,246 33,305 42,296 28,461 -59,563 10,835 11,055 6,120 
Source: Opel Hungary Powertrain and press reports 
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The end of car assembly has not meant that Opel would withdraw from Hungary; on the 
contrary, further investment projects had been completed to add gearboxes to the product 
lines. Thus, gearboxes have also been produced in Szentgotthárd since September 2000. First 
Allison gearboxes for commercial vehicles, and then Opel had spent DM230 million to build 
a new gearbox factory with a capacity of 250,000 units a year for cars. Production of these 
so-called CVT gearboxes commenced in January 2002. In the meantime, the capacity of the 
engine plant has been increased to 650,000 units a year, and that of the cylinder heads to 
530,000 units a year. With these projects, GM Opel’s investment in Hungary has totalled 600 
million euros (DM1.2 billion) by 2003. 
 
Supplier relationships 
As already mentioned, the assembly of Opel Astras was relocated to Poland at the end of 
1998 as Opel concentrated all its car production meant for Central and Eastern European 
markets in its new Polish plant. In the period of 1992-1998, the vast majority of parts and 
components were imported from Germany; essentially it was a CKD operation. Local content 
remained below 10 per cent. 
Opel Hungary, as opposed to Magyar Suzuki, has never been ‘forced’ to reach a certain 
level of local content as the cars assembled in Szentgotthárd were sold in the domestic 
market, and thus EU rules controlling access to the EU markets did not matter. In spite of 
that, they were trying to find local suppliers to reduce production costs. Most of its local 
suppliers were Hungarian subsidiaries of its long-established Western European partners. 
This is the second distinctive characteristics of Opel Hungary, compared to Magyar Suzuki: it 
prefers working with its well-known suppliers, and thus has encouraged them to set up their 
operations in Hungary, either investing in green-field plants, or taking over domestic firms, 
and transferring their technologies as well as managerial techniques to upgrade their skills 
and competences. 
The third distinguishing feature is that Opel Hungary seeks suppliers not only for its 
Hungarian operations but for other GM plants all over Europe, too. That means, on the one 
hand, that investments by its long-established suppliers in Hungary have not proved 
meaningless. On the other hand, production runs, i.e. several hundred thousand units a year, 
are not a problem either, and thus Hungarian suppliers could rely on economies of scale.15 
Opel Hungary only had 10 local suppliers in 1996, and 35 ones in 2003, together with 5 
ones in Romania and one in Slovenia. 
 
Table 4: Central and Eastern European suppliers of Opel Hungary, 1996-2003 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
CEE suppliers 10 13 17 26 29 33 35 41 
Source: Opel Hungary 
The rising number of local suppliers has been reflected in the value of purchased 
components for other GM plants. It amounted to DM118 million in 1994, i.e. worth 7.5 times 
more than Hungarian parts, materials and services bought for Opel Astras assembled in 
Szentgotthárd. Components exports to GM factories have substantially and continuously 
                                                 
15
 This ‘internal’ market further increased during the (short) period of strategic partnership between GM and 
Fiat. Accordingly, the purchasing department in Szentgotthárd was integrated into GM-Fiat Worldwide 
Purchasing during the partnership. 
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increased ever since then, reaching DM250 million (€125 million) by 1997, and €360 million 
by 2003. Purchasing contracts made by 2004 for 2006 worth over €500 million. 
Most of the components purchased are aluminium and other metal parts for car 
assembly operations in other GM plants. In other words, the majority of engine and gearbox 
components are still imported, although the engine and gearbox factories could provide good 
business opportunities for Hungarian suppliers, as far as production run is concerned. 
Western foundries and engineering firms, however, have set up either their subsidiaries in 
Hungary – either by taking over existing firms or investing in green-field plants – given the 
promising market opportunities provided by the expanded Opel engine and gearbox plants 
and the Audi engine plant opened in late 1994. (see the next sub-section) For example, Hydro 
(previously known as VAW) has opened its green-field aluminium foundry in Győr, close to 
the Austrian border, just to serve the Austrian and Hungarian engine plants of Opel. 
GM (Opel) also involves its T1 suppliers in developing components and sub-systems 
for new models. The basic concept is devised by GM, and once the supplier is selected, the 
details are elaborated jointly. As far as the production process is concerned, its development 
is the responsibility of the supplier entirely. Suppliers working with the purchasing 
department in Szentgotthárd are participating in the design of headlamps (SAPU), 
components of gearboxes (Linamar), car stereos, air-conditioners and airbag control 
equipment (Delphi); they are all foreign-owned. 
The smaller suppliers are supported by Opel Hungary’s engineers in the framework of 
its supplier development programme: technological, managerial, organisational, business 
planning and quality assurance knowledge is transferred in this way. 
Licences are not sold by Opel, and thus this channel is not used to diffuse the R&D 
results. Tacit knowledge, gained at Opel, however, is transferred to other companies in 
various ways. The usual form is that employees leave, quite often for higher positions at 
suppliers. At the first glance, it is a loss from the point of view of Opel Hungary; yet, the 
resources used to train these employees are not regarded as a waste. As finding new suppliers 
has become an important task, it is obviously easier to work with suppliers where former 
Opel employees are in high-ranking positions. In these cases it is much more simple to 
‘develop’ these suppliers: besides the formal training workshops, run by Opel Hungary, the 
day-to-day activities of the former Opel employees can also contribute significantly in 
various ways to the transfer the various Opel techniques and methods so as to upgrade the 
competences of the new suppliers. E.g. the former Opel employees can answer all sorts of 
questions, knowing the nitty-gritty from their own experience, i.e. in many cases there is no 
need to seek an ‘official’ meeting with Opel Hungary engineers. They can also offer short, 
problem-oriented internal training sessions to put the required Opel methods in place. 
Another method of knowledge spillover in market economies is setting up spin-off 
companies, quite often with the explicit, financial support of the ‘parent’ company so as to 
streamline its activities, but in the meantime establishing a sound, reliable basis for 
outsourcing, and thus cutting costs without taking too high a risk. It is not a wide-spread 
practice in Hungary yet, but there is a rather interesting example at Opel Hungary. 
Tool management, that is, designing new tools, producing or purchasing them, as well 
as maintenance of tools, is an important task at the Szentgotthárd plant, due its activities 
(machining parts for engines and gearboxes). In the beginning, an internal unit was dealing 
with these tasks, but it was decided to outsource these activities to a newly established small 
firm, set up by some Opel Hungary employees, together with two German tool making firms 
and an Austrian one. Since then it has grown to a successful firm with some 40 employees, 
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working for other Opel plants, too. Moreover, they are also running training courses on tool 
management. It is a rather unusual development: when applying for visa to teach at one of 
those courses in Germany, the civil servant dealing with that application at the consulate 
wanted to correct the term of “teaching” into “learning”16 as most Hungarian learn, rather 
than teach abroad. 
 
 
4.4. Audi Hungaria Motor Kft (AHM) 
A third car producer joined in 1998. Originally Audi AG has invested in Hungary in a new 
engine manufacturing plant, its first 100 per cent-owned manufacturing base outside 
Germany. Audi Hungaria Motor Kft (AHM), located in Győr, western Hungary, was opened 
in October 1994. It was the first engine plant in the world to manufacture five-valve, four-
cylinder, engines in commercial production. This new engine generation is built into Audi, 
Volkswagen Passat, SEAT, and Skoda models. Production of six- and eight-cylinder petrol 
engines has also been re-located to Győr. Moreover, two new sport models, TT Coupe and 
Roadster have been assembled since April 1998, and July 1999, respectively, at AHM. A 
third model, A3 was added in 2001. Output has been increased in several steps, and further 
engine components have also been added to the product lines, Audi has, therefore 
continuously invested in its Győr plant, amounting to over €2300 million by 2004. (Table 5) 
 
Table 5: Cumulative investments by Audi Hungaria Motor Kft, 1994-2004 (€ million) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
130 163 339 343 513 819 1,074 1,258 1,511 1,840 2,335 
Source: Audi Hungaria Motor 
Audi Hungaria Motor assembled over 100,000 engines in 1995, in its first full year of 
operation, and nearly 1.5 million in 2004. (Table 6) AHM was ranked second among the 
exporting companies already in 1997 (producing almost 600,000 engines that year), and 
became number one in 1998, retaining that position since then. It made the sixth largest 
profits before taxation among firms registered in Hungary in 1997, and was ranked second 
both in 2000 and 2001, while third in 2003. 
Audi opened a new engine development centre in Győr in June 2001, initially investing 
€18 million. The main task of the centre is to develop production technologies to cut costs, 
and to improve the performance of existing engines. It has been an inevitable step since Győr 
has become the engine production base for the company. It might also be rational to perform 
some design and/or engineering tasks in Győr related to the sport models, as those are only 
assembled in Hungary. A further €8 million was invested in 2004 t extend the centre, 
doubling the staff to 100. 
A new tool shop was opened in September 2005, as a result of a €40 million investment 
project. This new unit currently employs 170 workers, to be extended to 320. It is also 
pressing body parts for specialty models, produced in small runs, e.g. for Audi RS4. 
 
                                                 
16
 These terms are rather close in German: ‘lehren’, and ‘lernen’, respectively. Thus, the assumption was that the 
Hungarian applicants had made a mistake. 
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Table 6: Performance of Audi Hungaria Motor Kft (AHM), 1995-2004 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Engines (units) 104,159 196,352 584,665 986,773 1,001,912 1,060,828 1,220,217 1,280,067 1,334,985 1,480,630 
Cars (units) – – – 13,593 52,579 56,776 55,296 53,605 32,337 23,589 
Revenues (m HUF) 27,853 54,068 188,925 482,688 720,854 900,597 853,799 838,011 975,928 n.a. 
Revenues (m €) 149 266 851 1,889 2,828 3,399 3,466 3,552 3,772 3,924 
Exports (m HUF) 27,853 54,025 188,735 481,797 720,286 899,695 853,000 836,504 974,430 n.a. 
Employment (end of year) 309 1,011 2,204 3,425 4,312 4,831 4,848 4,828 5,014 5,074 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) 2,811 4,386 15,900 44,343 65,992 84,379 68,259 66,257* 82,371 n.a. 
Source: Audi Hungaria Motor and press reports 
* Profits after taxation 
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Supplier relationships 
Audi AG has not committed itself to increase the level of domestic sourcing. Local suppliers 
account for 5 per cent of the value of engines assembled in Győr. All the major components 
of engines are machined in Győr, using imported casts. AHM managing directors intend to 
purchase casts and forged parts from Hungarian suppliers. So far a few local – usually at least 
partly foreign-owned – companies have won orders, shipping machined parts for the engine 
plant and seats, aluminium and plastic parts for the car assembly plant. Casts are supplied by 
another foreign-owned firm (originally German, and then taken over by Norwegian investors) 
based in Győr.17 
AHM buys inputs through the Volkswagen Group purchasing department (to cut prices 
of raw materials and components bought in large volumes). This also means that suppliers, 
capable to meet Audi requirements, could increase their chance to win further orders from 
other VW firms. Audi buys various products and services worth €70-80 million a year from 
Hungarian companies for AHM plus various parts worth DM40-50 million for other VW 
subsidiaries. The latter amount is projected to increase to €100 million. 
 
 
5. RE-STRUCTURING COMPONENTS MANUFACTURING 
5.1. Industry definition: a methodological note 
Automotive component manufacturing was not considered a separate industry in international 
statistics until the 1980s. In the first decades of car manufacturing, independent companies 
supplied parts as a side business, along with machines, instruments, and parts for other 
transport equipment, such as bicycles and carriages. Later, car manufacturers either acquired 
their suppliers or established in-house production of components. Thus information and 
statistics on this sector used to be subsumed under the automobile or motor vehicle industry. 
In the 1980s, however, automotive parts emerged as an important industry in its own right 
because of changes in technology, organisation and trade. The role of component suppliers 
increased not only in production but also in design; their technical and economic performance 
has became a key factor in the competition among car manufacturers. Thus the sector now is 
a new ‘entry’ in statistics due to its economic significance. A simple reason is that on average 
10000-12000 parts are built into a car, accounting for some 50-70% of the manufacturing 
cost of an automobile. 
As a very wide range of products are used to assemble a motor vehicle – practically all 
industrial sectors supply the automotive industry –, readily available statistics are usually too 
narrow in terms of coverage. In other words, quite a few automotive suppliers are classified 
as leather, rubber, plastics, paint, glass, cable or metal producing and processing companies, 
foundries, electrical and electronics companies, etc. The EU statistical classification also 
follows this line, i.e. motor vehicle parts and accessories (NACE 34.30) excludes engine and 
tyre manufacturers, most of the electrical and electronic components, as well glass, plastic or 
certain castings and other metal parts. 
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 It also serves two Opel engine plants nearby: one operating in Szentgotthárd, the other in Austria. 
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The current Hungarian statistical classification system,18 practically in harmony with 
the EU methodology, identifies four automotive sub-sectors: 
 manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles (3161); 
 manufacture of motor vehicles (3410); 
 manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles (3420), and 
 manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (3430). 
 
 
5.2. Performance of the Hungarian automotive components suppliers 
Two of these sectors are relevant for this study: manufacture of electrical equipment for 
engines and vehicles (3161) (henceforth: electrical automotive components), and manufacture 
of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (3430) (henceforth: manufacture 
of automotive components). Although these names might suggest that these two sectors cover 
at least the majority of automotive suppliers, this is not the case: just as in the EU statistics on 
the automotive components sector, a wide range of products are excluded (e.g. engines, tyres, 
glass, plastic, castings and other metal parts as well as bulbs). For this reason available 
statistics only included 150-160 firms in the early 1990s, while experts estimated that 
altogether some 300-350 companies were producing motor vehicle parts and components in 
Hungary.19 Partly due to a better statistical coverage, and in part due to a genuine increase in 
the number of companies, the 2001 data already covered some 250 firms in two sectors, 
namely 3161 and 3430. 
These two sectors have significantly increased their sales: the 2003 output of electrical 
automotive components was around 13 times as much as in 1992, and the other sector – from 
a much higher absolute level –  grew almost 7 times bigger than in 1992, using constant 
[1992] price data.20 (For current price data, see Tables 7-8.) The export intensity of these 
sectors is also worth noting, particularly in the case of the electrical automotive components 
(3161), where the ratio of exports to sales further increased from an already high level: from 
58 per cent in 1992 to around 90% in 2004. Thus, it can be established beyond doubt that 
these companies face a fierce competition: given the globalised nature of the automotive 
industry and the liberal import regime there is a strong rivalry in their domestic market, and 
they also face harsh competition in their export markets, where the bulk of their output is 
shipped. Moreover, their financial performance has significantly improved, too, i.e. they are 
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 It was introduced in 1992. Previously components manufacturing, in line with the previous international 
methodology, was treated as part of the automotive industry. Hence no data on components manufacturing are 
available prior 1992, and thus the current performance of the sector cannot be compared to the one in the pre-
1990 period. In other words, it is not possible to analyse the results of the restructuring process statistically. 
19
 The primary producers are Rába (diesel engines and axles for commercial vehicles), Bakony Művek 
(electrical parts), MMG (instrument panels), PEMŰ, TVK, Kaloplasztik, Kunplast (all plastic parts), Perion 
(batteries), IMAG (seats, wiring harnesses), Videoton (printed circuits, electrical parts and wiring harnesses), 
Knorr-Bremse (brakes), ADA, Pre-cast and Le Belier (all foundries), GE Tungsram (lighting) and Taurus 
(rubber parts). Besides these long-established Hungarian companies – some of them already privatised by 
foreign investors as their new names suggest – well-known foreign companies have also set up their 
subsidiaries, e.g. Akzo (paints), Bosch, Ford (electrical parts), Cascade and Happich (plastic parts), Denso (fuel 
pumps), ITT Automotive (electrical parts and wiring harnesses), Michels Kabel (wiring harnesses), Packard 
Electric (electrical parts and wiring harnesses), UTA (wiring harnesses), VAW (castings) and ZF (gearboxes). 
The major customers are the local car assemblers, Western European carmakers and their first-tier suppliers, as 
well as North American commercial vehicle companies. 
20
 Constant 1992 prices have been calculated by taking into account producer price indices for these two sectors, 
or for some years the nearest available ones, e.g. indices for the sector 316, instead of the ones for 3161. 
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not ‘buying’ export markets at the expense of their profits.21 Thus, their impressive growth in 
1992-2005 is even more remarkable. Figures indicate that the underlying factor of their 
success is improved labour productivity: measured as value added per employees, in real 
terms it has increased by 2.5 times in the electrical automotive components sector (3161), and 
doubled in the other one (3430).22 Another ‘proxy’ for labour productivity can be sales per 
employees; then one can observe a 3.6-fold increase in the case of electrical automotive 
equipment, and a 3.5-fold improvement in the case of automotive components (using constant 
price figures). Case study evidence suggests that this noteworthy improvement is thanks to 
the introduction of new processes and management techniques (see Sections 4.2-4.4), and in a 
number of cases due to the modernisation of equipment, too, reflected in the increase of 
assets (by around 7 times, in both sectors, using historical asset pricing). 
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 Yet, the profitability of the components sector (3430) – measured as net profits/sales – was rather low until 
1997, and fluctuating in the range of 8.6-10.6 per cent since 1998. The other sector (3161) is rather volatile in 
this respect: it was in the red until 1995, then fared quite well in 1996-2000 (with a net profit/sales ratio between 
6.9 and 10.7 per cent), and performing significantly below that level in 2000-2003. 
22
 GDP implicit price indices have been used to ‘deflate’ current price value added figures. Of course, only an 
indication of real term value added figures can be calculated in this way; a proper method would be to use GDP 
deflators at a sectoral level, but those indices are not available. That is why another indicator is also used here: 
sales per employees, using sectoral producer price indices to calculate real term sales figures. 
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Table 7: Manufacture of electrical automotive components (3161), 1992-2005 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005/1992* 
Number of companies 32 39 41 42 49 57 61 62 60 69 72 78 96  89  278.1% 
Sales (m HUF**) 8,208 16,408 27,655 38,578 63,539 95,486 133,741 191,706 236,945 250,648 212,794 280,396 270,608 305,430 3721.1% 
  of which: exports (m HUF) 4,758 4,983 16,923 28,150 54,588 85,367 107,173 155,498 216,253 226,586 190,115 252,983 242,510 .. .. 
Exports/sales (%) 58.0 30.4 61.2 73.0 85.9 89.4 80.1 81.1 91.3 90.4 89.3 90.2 89.6 .. .. 
Employment (average, heads) 5,658 6,464 7,070 7,619 10,667 13,189 14,888 16,622 23,630 17,605 19,409 20,033 20,419 22,511 397.9% 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) -1,070 -558 -1,405 -1,527 4,815 9,243 10,050 13,845 26,395 16,713 9,870 18,307 .. .. .. 
Net profits (m HUF) -1,140 -651 -1,487 -1,625 4,512 9,100 9,661 13,147 25,386 15,506 8,450 13,037 .. .. .. 
Assets (m HUF) 8,218 11,628 12,113 14,730 21,638 28,916 35,790 44,243 52,640 65,207 46,185 60,066 .. .. .. 
Value added (m HUF) 2,098 4,466 7,634 8,785 19,980 32,565 38,802 49,968 59,726 62,848 60,311 80,163 75,593 80,091 3817.5% 
Sales/employee (m HUF) 1.5 2.5 3.9 5.1 6.0 7.2 9.0 11.5 10.0 14.2 11.0 14.0 13.3 13.6 935.3% 
Value added/employee (000 HUF) 370.8 690.9 1,079.8 1,153.0 1,873.1 2,469.1 2,606.3 3,006.1 2,527.5 3,569.9 3,107.4 4,001.5 3,702.1 3,557.9 959.5% 
Net profits/sales (%) -13.9 -4.0 -5.4 -4.2 7.1 9.5 7.2 6.9 10.7 6.2 4.0 4.6 .. .. .. 
Value added/sales (%) 25.6 27.2 27.6 22.8 31.4 34.1 29.0 26.1 25.2 25.1 28.3 28.6 27.9% 26.2% 102.6% 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
* In case the 1992 data are negative, 1996 is used as a base year 
** Current prices, throughout the table 
 
Table 8: Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (3430), 1992-2005 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005/1992* 
Number of companies 88 116 118 132 137 155 165 173 178 180 176 179 224 218 247.7% 
Sales (m HUF**) 24,335 32,272 40,949 62,217 85,814 146,793 218,670 273,930 358,961 412,528 398,180 522,915 605,927 733,764 3015.3% 
  of which: exports (m HUF) 14,053 17,689 23,038 40,377 56,655 105,615 172,223 223,116 309,087 331,985 346,287 445,015 532,530  3166.7% 
Exports/sales (%) 57.7 54.8 56.3 64.9 66.0 71.9 78.8 81.5 86.1 80.5 87.0 85.1% 87.9%  147.4% 
Employment (average, heads) 14,238 14,914 15,091 15,490 16,574 19,485 21,753 22,079 22,436 24,720 22,189 26,673 27,614 29,319 205.9% 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) -77 582 1,014 3,292 3,107 8,743 23,989 31,231 41,907 39,470 41,059  58,772 .. .. .. 
Net profits (m HUF) -154 318 889 3,030 2,751 8,303 23,098 27,795 37,402 35,471 36,914 49,879 .. .. .. 
Assets (m HUF) 24,040 24,891 26,133 28,310 48,116 70,095 93,983 105,267 117,025 149,364 141,699 169,020 .. .. .. 
Value added (m HUF) 9,243 11,523 14,631 20,123 24,520 40,486 62,089 79,961 102,648 117,089 114,445 147,709 164,104 182,781 1977.5% 
Sales/employee (m HUF) 1.7 2.2 2.7 4.0 5.2 7.5 10.1 12.4 16.0 16.7 17.9 19.6 21.9 25.0 1464.3% 
Value added/employee (000 HUF) 649.2 772.6 969.5 1,299.1 1,479.4 2,077.8 2,854.3 3,621.6 4,575.1 4,736.6 5,157.7 5,537.8 5,942.8 6,234.2 960.3% 
Net profits/sales (%) -0.6 1.0 2.2 4.9 3.2 5.7 10.6 10.1 10.4 8.6 9.3 9.5% .. .. .. 
Value added/sales (%) 38.0 35.7 35.7 32.3 28.6 27.6 28.4 29.2 28.6 28.4 28.7 28.2% 27.1% 24.9% 65.6% 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
* In case the 1992 data are negative, 1993 is used as a base year 
** Current prices, throughout the table 
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5.3. Ownership Patterns 
As far as ownership is concerned, a wide variety of forms can be observed. For qualitative 
analytical purposes it is worth listing the actual ownership forms: 
 
A) Dominant Foreign Ownership 
A.1 Green-field investments with 100 per cent foreign ownership. For the purpose 
of further analysis, it is useful to identify two sub-sets in this group: 
A.1.1 Subsidiaries of car manufacturers: AUDI Hungaria Motor Kft., Visteon 
Hungary Kft (Ford), Opel Hungary 
A.1.2 Subsidiaries of component manufacturers: e.g. Bosch, Continental Teves 
(ITT Automotive Hungary before 1998), Lear (formerly United Technologies 
Automotive Hungary), Denso, Hydro Aluminium Győr Kft (previously VAW), 
Michels Kabel, Keiper-Recaro 
A.2 ‘Brown-field’ investments: former state-owned companies privatised by foreign 
investors, e.g. Knorr-Bremse, (Delco) Remy, ZF 
B) Dominant Hungarian Ownership 
B.1 State-owned companies 
B.2 Privatised former state-owned companies:23 e.g. Bakony Művek Rt., MMG 
Automatika Rt., Perion Akkumulátorgyár Rt. 
B.3 Private companies, i.e. firms established by Hungarian entrepreneurs, e.g. ABF 
Bowdentechnika Kft 
B.4 Joint ventures with dominant Hungarian private ownership, e.g. RATIPUR 
Car Equipment Co. 
Individual companies can be relatively easily classified using these categories, although 
some companies might have started with green-field sites and taken over existing plants as a 
brown-field investment at a later stage as they extended their activities in Hungary – or the 
other way around, e.g. Bosch. As for a more rigorous quantitative analysis at a sectoral level, 
however, a number of methodological problems arise. First, it is needless to stress that 
ownership changes have been quite frequent in these sectors, especially until the late 1990s, 
and hence the overall picture, i.e. the ratio of different ownership forms, has been constantly 
changing. Therefore, from the point of view of economic analysis, it is a ‘moving target’. 
Second, given the lack of readily available statistics, it is not possible to precisely 
establish the ratio of private and state ownership. While seven distinct types of owners are 
recognised in the Hungarian statistics, namely the state, municipalities, domestic individuals, 
domestic corporations, ESOP, foreigners and co-operatives, published statistics only provide 
figures on state-owned and foreign-owned equity. Moreover, one category of ownership – 
namely ‘domestic corporations’, that is, share holding and limited liability companies – does 
not distinguish private and state ownership.24 Bearing in mind these methodological 
limitations, available statistics do suggest a dominant share of private (in particular foreign) 
ownership in both sectors. Data are presented separately for two different periods, namely 
1992-1997, and 1998-2003, for methodological reasons (see Tables 9-12). 
                                                 
23
 Privatisation has been usually conducted as a combination of ESOP (employee stock ownership programme) 
and MBO (management buy-out) projects. In some cases it has only been partial, i.e. a certain share of state 
ownership has been retained, especially in the first stage of privatisation. 
24
 Therefore an apparently legitimate formula, assuming that the municipality-owned assets are almost 
negligible, and thus the ratio of private ownership equals 100% minus state ownership minus 2-6% for 
municipality stakes, would lead to deceptive results. 
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Table 9: Ownership changes in the manufacture of electrical automotive components 
(3161), 1992-1997 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Equity (m HUF) 2,065.8 832.6 842.7 918.4 9,624.0 2,569.6 
  of which: foreign ownership 121.1 166.5 276.2 505.4 9,282.7 2,200.0 
  state ownership 1,537.2 154.0 154.0 15.0 15.1 13.2 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 5.9 20.0 32.8 55.0 96.5 85.6 
Note: Only double-book-keeping companies are included 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and author’s calculations 
 
Table 10: Ownership changes in the manufacture of electrical automotive components 
(3161), 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Equity (m HUF) 14,968 16,525 23,442 28,421 24,613 37,666 
  of which: state (incl. municipalities) 0 0 0 0 0 3 
             foreign 12,222 13,067 19,540 24,360 20,536 33,382 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 81.7 79.1 83.4 85.7 83.4 88.6 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
 
Table 11: Ownership changes in the manufacture of parts and components for motor 
vehicles (3430), 1992-1997 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Equity (m HUF) 19,657.8 21,831.8 22,400.9 23,598.9 27,478.5 40,173.6 
  Of which: foreign ownership 2,517.8 3,348.1 4,029.3 6,080.8 8,669.8 22,246.8 
  state ownership 9,130.3 9,051.4 7,190.5 5,434.6 4,389.6 338.0 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 12.8 15.3 18.0 25.8 31.6 55.4 
Note: Only double-book-keeping companies are included 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and author’s calculations 
 
Table 12: Ownership changes in the manufacture of parts and components for motor 
vehicles (3430), 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Equity (m HUF) 60,631 69,396 69,536 75,634 57,374 63,522 
  Of which: state (incl. municipalities) 445 445 445 445 804 804 
             foreign 45,048 51,336 53,099 58,622 41,272 46,948 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 74.3 74.0 76.4 77.5 71.9 73,9 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
 
 
6 PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
Although car assemblers, T1, T2 and T3 suppliers are all necessary to constitute a production 
network, and in the end of the day they all share the network’s destiny, they have different 
responsibilities in the division of labour in a given network, and they have to face different 
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type of risks. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse them somewhat separately – but also 
keeping in mind the strong and close ties among them. 
 
6.1 Evolving strategies for car-makers to improve competitiveness 
Car-makers have to face a strong competition and mature markets in their traditional area of 
operation. Moreover, they are not – and in the foreseeable future most likely they will not be 
– in the position to expect a ‘breakthrough’ from this trap relying mainly on ‘revolutionary’ 
technological innovations. Thus they have to devise and implement other strategies: 
 cutting costs in order to keep existing markets via offering lower prices, 
 introducing new features, offering new functions (e.g. safety, comfort, global positioning 
systems, recycling) as well as improving reliability and fuel economy, 
 creating new market segments in long-established, mature, markets by introducing e.g. 
sports models, four-wheel-drive cars, light trucks, minivans, 
 finding new markets with new customers and ideally less intense competition, 
 introducing organisational innovations to improve flexibility, shorten lead and delivery 
times,25 
 customising mass-produced models, that is, offering the opportunity to buyers to ‘design’ 
their own car, using, of course, a set of standardised components.26 
In short, price is still the bottom line of competitiveness in the car industry, yet many 
more characteristics have become a must for car-makers. Two of the above strategic elements 
are the most relevant from a Central and Eastern European point of view: cost-cutting and 
entering new markets. 
Cost-cutting is a decisive element of basically all car-makers’ strategy. That is why 
they set up their new plants in South America, South-East Asia, as well as Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), where production costs are usually lower than in their established 
bases, and for the same reason they encourage their suppliers to follow them, and/or to find 
other ways to offer cheaper parts and components. Another way of cost-cutting is to 
introduce improved production equipment and vehicle components (that is, incremental 
technological innovations, as opposed to radical innovations) as well as more efficient 
production processes (organisational and managerial innovations).27 In the lean production 
paradigm – as opposed to the Fordist one – suppliers are important sources of innovations, 
and new products, processes and managerial techniques are spread quickly throughout the 
whole network (assembler, T1, T2 and T3 suppliers). 
                                                 
25
 Lead times – once constituting a major competitive edge for Japanese carmakers – have become rather short, 
thanks to the introduction of lean production, where T1 suppliers are involved in the design of new models, and 
the so-called rugby approach is used – instead of the former ‘relay’ method – among the various departments 
involved in designing a new model. (Graves, 1991, 1994) This new phenomenon underlines the importance of 
organisational innovations, too. 
26
 No doubt, it requires a great deal of flexibility in terms of manufacturing and logistics, and, in turn, might lead 
to longer delivery time and higher costs. Therefore organisational innovations, coming either from carmakers or 
T1 suppliers, are of crucial importance. Quite often, though, technological innovations are necessary 
preconditions of organisational innovations, e.g. improved flexibility obviously requires organisational 
innovations, which, in turn, usually necessitate an appropriate, customised new IT tool kit and/or improved 
production equipment. 
27
 A successful concept of cost-cutting is the so-called platform strategy whereby the basic components of 3-5 
models are shared, and thus economies of scales in producing those elements and product variety – that is, 
apparently different models serving different markets (or segments) – can be achieved simultaneously. This 
concept requires the introduction of a set of interrelated technological and organisational innovations. 
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Emerging markets are also considered to be important because by definition they 
promise new buyers. Moreover, in the late 1980s CEE countries competition among car-
makers was practically unknown; on the contrary, buyers had to ‘compete’ with each others 
for cars. Hence, most cars were rather obsolete in these countries, making people even more 
‘hungry’ for ‘Western’ cars in the late 1980s. In short, it seemed to be a Paradise for car-
makers. However, this region has become crowded in a very short period of time as several 
major West European, US and Asian companies have invested in production facilities. To 
make it worse, optimistic sales forecast have not materialised either, as most people cannot 
afford new cars, especially in the potentially largest markets, i.e. in CIS countries. 
The three car-makers operating in Hungary apply different elements of the above 
strategic mix. Magyar Suzuki assembles small cars. In this segment, profit margins are rather 
low because the main competition axis is price. Suzuki also puts emphasis on fuel economy, 
and hence organises special rallies where the most economical drivers are awarded. From 
time to time small, special batches are produced to appeal to a certain customer group. New 
models have already been introduced to replace the outdated original model, and further ones 
are to be added to the product lines in the coming years. As they belong to the same segment, 
competitiveness is also based on price, as well as fuel economy; yet, design features are 
likely to play a more important role than in the 1990s. 
Opel has decided to abandon car assembly in Hungary. Its new strategy is focusing on 
low cost manufacturing of high-tech, high-value-added components – engine components, 
engines and gearboxes – as well as low cost, high quality R&D conducted in Hungary to help 
improve its overall competitiveness. In short, it is a global strategy with carefully planned 
division of labour among various Opel plants across countries. 
AUDI Hungaria Motor, besides producing engines in large volumes for the entire VW 
group, assembles its two new sports models in Győr, aimed at serving a special market 
segment of the affluent young professionals, primarily in the Western European and US 
markets. In this segment, design – technical and aesthetic features – is the key element of the 
competition. Yet, price should be kept as low as possible, and flexibility is even more 
important than in the case of ‘normal’ cars because of seasonal cycles in demand. Hence, 
Hungary seems to be an ideal production base with skilled but cheap workers and flexible 
labour regulations compared to Germany. 
 
 
6.2 Competitive strategies of suppliers 
T1 suppliers are increasingly similar to car assemblers in many respects, and thus they have 
to face a similar – competitive, global – environment. Reliable quality, continuous cost-
cutting – with all its methods and prerequisites discussed above –, timely delivery, as well as 
the ability to innovate and manage the rest of the supply chain are all indispensable for 
survival. Therefore, it is hardly possible to single out any distinctive, new competition axis. 
T2 and T3 suppliers, however, have less responsibilities, the main factor to improve their 
competitive position is price. Nonetheless, all of them should be able to maintain reliable 
quality and timely shipment of parts, as well as introduce the technological and organisational 
innovations developed by assemblers or T1 suppliers. 
These general observations apply to the Hungarian case, too. T1 suppliers – e.g. 
Continental Teves, Knorr-Bremse, and ZF – serve the global markets from their Hungarian 
production bases; only an almost negligible fraction of their output is shipped to the local car 
assembly plants. In the beginning, their primary concern was cost-cutting in the production 
phase. Gradually, however, they have recognised that Hungarian engineers and researchers at 
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various R&D units can provide useful services for their internationalised R&D projects, too, 
at a rather low cost. Therefore, they have already set up their own, in-house R&D units or 
decided to do so. Continental Teves is a somewhat exceptional case. Initially its small 
Hungarian R&D unit mainly worked for the German subsidiary, not for the local one. Since 
2001, however, it has been extended, and become responsible to develop sensor technologies 
at a European scale, and thus also works for the Hungarian subsidiaries. The other way is to 
‘delegate’ Hungarian engineers into the parent company’s global research teams. UTA, for 
example, has not opened an in-house R&D unit, its engineers, however, are involved in a 
number of R&D projects run by various subsidiaries of the parent company. Sometimes they 
work abroad for a certain period, at other times they work from Hungary, but as members of 
virtual networks. 
As for the intensity of competition in the local market, it should be taken into account 
that some 10-12 thousand parts and components are used to build a vehicle. To put it simply, 
an engine manufacturer, say, might account for a very large share of the whole components 
sector’s output, yet, it does not mean that it would dominate, say, a seat manufacturer, who, 
in turn, has a much smaller share of the components sector’s output. 
As for a more qualitative overview, there is a strong competition in the automotive 
components manufacturing. Although some companies might have a relatively large 
domestic market share, e.g. in the case of axles, batteries, bearings or lighting, they also have 
to face a fierce competition in their export markets, and given the relatively small size of the 
Hungarian market as well as the importance of scale economies, they cannot avoid exporting 
the bulk of their output. The only exception is engine manufacturing: the combined capacity 
of Audi and Opel is around 2 million units a year, and thus it is a large enough market for 
their suppliers. That is why foreign foundries and machining companies are setting up their 
Hungarian operations (e.g. ADA, Pre-cast, Le Belier, Hydro [originally VAW] and Jung). In 
this case, there is strong competition for the ‘domestic market’. The engines produced in 
Hungary, in turn, are shipped to the various car assembly plants of the entire VW group and 
GM Opel in Europe. 
 
 
6.3 Production networks: sources of innovation 
Relying on a survey conducted in the mid-1990s, as well as on a series of interviews and case 
studies conducted in the late 1990s, and then in 2002-2004, two major lessons can be drawn. 
First, the Hungarian case confirms the general picture emerging from the literature, namely 
that car assemblers and their T1 suppliers are the most important sources of innovation for 
the entire production network they coordinate. Second, some buyers, or their first-tier foreign 
suppliers, provide licences and know-how free of charge for T2 and T3 suppliers. The most 
important example was Magyar Suzuki in the 1990s (also offering various forms of financial 
assistance for tooling-up). This is the major element of an explanation to reconcile the 
apparent contradiction between the low level of expenditures on technology related activities, 
and the introduction of relatively large number of new products and processes.28 In other 
cases, however, it is a prerequisite to buy certain licences or know-how, otherwise there is no 
business. 
As already mentioned, Hungarian automotive suppliers have to adjust to a radically 
altered international and domestic environment (import liberalisation, loss of former markets, 
new players in Hungary, etc.). Thus, those who want to survive have also introduced new 
                                                 
28
 Another major factor is that these innovations represent so-called low- or mid-tech technologies, rather than 
high-tech ones, and hence financially they are less demanding. 
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management techniques. The most important types of these innovations are total quality 
management and reliable cost accounting. Foreign partners usually provide technical 
assistance and training courses to facilitate the introduction of these techniques. 
Managerial innovations can be analysed at the level of production networks, too, as 
opposed to the company level. In the lean production system, first-tier suppliers assume a 
considerable part of responsibility for product development as well as for organising and 
managing the supply chain (logistics) as they build and supply entire systems or sub-systems, 
rather than individual components. In other words, they are responsible for second-tier – and 
indirectly – for third-tier suppliers’ performance, too. Thus, they also provide training, 
technical assistance to their suppliers to facilitate the introduction of an appropriate quality 
management, cost accounting, production and delivery systems, etc. More recently Western 
car-makers follow this way, i.e. they cut the number of their first-tier (direct) suppliers and 
give them more responsibility. 
This ‘tiering’ has hardly occurred in Hungary until the early 1990s. One should not be 
surprised, however, as most Hungarian companies have supplied simple, individual parts, 
rather than complex sub-systems to their customers. Moreover, they have not been involved 
in product development, either, as the models produced by Audi Hungaria, Magyar Suzuki 
and Opel Hungary had been designed before their assembly started in Hungary. One should 
take into account that it was a relatively new concept even for the Western European 
managers until the mid-1990s. A detailed analysis of the British automotive industry in that 
period also claimed, that British managers had a long way to go, too, on the road leading 
towards ‘tiering’: 
“By collaboration, the first tier of suppliers may help to develop the value chain of vehicle 
manufacturer or the progress and competitiveness of a national or regional industry. There has 
been little such activity so far: indeed the major UK suppliers could more accurately be called 
an unconnected group, rather than a first tier.” (DTI and SMMT, 1994, p. 11) 
Their Hungarian counter-parts, however, first had to learn even the ‘simple’ techniques 
of market economy, too, not only these new principles of lean supply. Moreover, in the 
meantime they also had to struggle for survival. More recently, however, some preliminary 
signs of the emerging new supply system can be observed in certain cases. Subsidiaries of 
major Western component manufacturers are taking on board more Hungarian suppliers, and 
thus a more pronounced ‘tiering’ can be observed. For example, ZF has developed a supplier 
park around its plant in Eger. In short, T1 suppliers assume responsibility in organising the 
supply chain in Hungary, too, following the global patterns. 
 
 
7. PROSPECTS FOR HUNGARIAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS 
7.1 Modes of growth 
Discussing the growth opportunities and various modes of growth open to the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) automobile firms, it is worth distinguishing different kind of 
countries (small vs. large; advanced vs. laggard in terms of transition; level of economic 
development;)29 and firms (assemblers vs. suppliers). The success of different growth 
strategies, in turn, depends on firms’ performance vis-à-vis their competitors as well as the 
                                                 
29
 Different traditions in automotive industry obviously have different impacts on growth opportunities and 
modes of growth, e.g. the Czech car industry has been based on own product development while the Polish, 
Russian, Romanian and Serbian ones on licences. Hungary represents another case by having strong traditions in 
commercial vehicle and automotive components manufacturing but only ‘remote memories’ in car assembly. 
 27 
macroeconomic situation (overall demand, standard of living, taxes and other levies on cars 
and components, etc.) and trade policies of the respective countries. Firms operating in 
countries with large domestic market – e.g. Russia – can, in principle, devise strategies to 
serve their home markets, while firms based in small or medium-sized countries – e.g. the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia (all small) and Poland (medium-sized) – must 
seek export opportunities should they want to grow. Globalisation of the automotive industry 
means both opportunities and threats for these firms. 
Car and commercial vehicle assemblers privatised by large foreign automotive 
companies, and thus integrated into their global technological, production and marketing 
networks, might expect the brightest growth opportunities, e.g. VW-Skoda, Fiat Auto Poland. 
This is usually organic growth, i.e. output is increased by producing new or significantly 
improved vehicles. Acquisition of other – automotive or non-automotive – firms is not likely. 
Some commercial vehicle assemblers have been privatised by domestic investors, e.g. in the 
Czech Republic. It is to be seen if these investors can be successful in bringing capital, new 
technologies in, and find markets; all required for organic growth. In some cases acquisitions 
by other, large, powerful companies have occurred, and it might be a potential way out of the 
lack of capital. Hardly any growth – on the contrary: contraction – can be foreseen for 
assemblers not privatised yet. 
As for suppliers, five different modes can be identified.30 The following taxonomy not 
only lists these possibilities but also discusses the relationship between a specific mode of 
growth and R&D. 
a) Organic or indigenous growth based on the existing product lines: increased output of 
the same products given extended capacity and/or improved productivity. It might only be 
possible in those countries where basically the ‘good old’ cars and other vehicles are still 
produced and can be sold. Hardly any R&D or training and re-training – skill formation – 
is required. At best, some process development and training, re-training is conducted. 
b) Organic or indigenous growth based on a diversified, yet, still automotive product mix: 
increased output thanks to further automotive products added to the existing product lines. 
Most suppliers, previously shipping their products to various CMEA countries, and having 
lost these markets, have had to take this path, e.g. producing parts for Western European 
and Asian cars and/or commercial vehicles.31 Capital and skill formation is required – yet, 
accumulated skills and experience might provide a sound basis. New products – and then 
almost inevitably – new processes and management techniques should be introduced. 
Sources of these innovations vary widely (vehicle assemblers, T1 and other suppliers, in-
house and extra-mural R&D units). The supplier in question has to be involved in the 
innovation process to a varying extent, depending on the source of innovation. 
c) Organic or indigenous growth based on a diversified product mix: increased output 
thanks to adding non-automotive products to the existing product lines. This option is 
                                                 
30
 One also has to bear in mind that a wide range of distinctively different industries are to be found among 
automotive parts and components manufacturers, e.g. chemicals (paints, plastics), rubber, glass, textile, leather, 
metal, engineering, electronics, etc. Therefore a thorough analysis should take into account 
technological/sectoral characteristics. Further decisive factors of growth include firm-specific factors (size, 
ownership, technological and managerial capabilities, etc.), role of foreign investors in the domestic automotive 
industry, assembler-supplier relationships, macroeconomic situation. 
31
 This mode of growth clearly shows that the traditional definition of growth might not be appropriate in 
transition economies. For detailed, firm-level case studies it is worth considering a special definition of (or 
approach to) growth: given the radical re-structuring in the region (collapse of the CMEA, import liberalisation, 
privatisation, etc.) sometimes survival can, and, indeed, should be regarded as growth, even with a contracted 
output, say, compared to the mid-1980s, if the current output consists of new products sold to new clients. 
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most probable in the case of suppliers with already mixed product lines, i.e. producing 
plastic, rubber, metal, etc. parts for different industries. Requirements are similar the ones 
under point b. 
d) Acquisition of another automotive firm, domestic or foreign. Capital needs to be found 
for this action, it is, therefore, an existing, yet, a rare case. Further, production, R&D and 
management skills and practices need to be harmonised for success, and these are 
undoubtedly difficult tasks even in a stable economy, let alone in the CEE economies. 
e) Acquisition of a non-automotive firm, domestic or foreign. This option is most probable 
in the case of suppliers with already mixed product lines, i.e. producing plastic, rubber, 
metal, etc. parts for different industries. Requirements and challenges are similar the ones 
under point d. 
 
 
7.2 Outlook for Hungarian automotive suppliers 
Privatisation of car assembly in the neighbouring countries provides both challenges and 
opportunities for Hungarian automotive suppliers. Western European investors, on the one 
hand, tend to rely on their long-established suppliers. Moreover, Fiat is one of the most 
vertically-integrated car-maker. Therefore some Hungarian suppliers lost their former 
businesses when Fiat took over FSM. However, even Fiat has embarked upon a new sourcing 
strategy, i.e. it has started divesting its in-house component manufacturing plants in Poland in 
order to cut costs and to focus on its core business. Thus there are new market opportunities 
even in this case for competitive suppliers, especially for Central European subsidiaries of 
well-known Western European firms, given that these suppliers can combine reputation, low 
production costs and favourable location. 
Asian firms, on the other hand, do not have a long-established supply base in Europe. 
Thus, they have to search for local suppliers if they want to meet the local content rule of the 
EU. Magyar Suzuki has rapidly increased the local content of its cars produced in Hungary, 
and several Hungarian suppliers are shipping their products to Japan. 
Table 13 analyses the major characteristics of different types of companies in the 
framework of a tentative taxonomy, developed in section 5.3. It also considers the most likely 
prospects for each group of companies.32 Two sub-groups, namely private companies and 
joint ventures with dominant Hungarian private ownership are not included as firms in these 
sub-groups differ considerably from each other, i.e. their products, processes, market 
opportunities can vary on a very wide scale. Two distinctive features, however, can be 
pointed out. First, usually they are much smaller than A.1–B.2 companies. Second, the so-
called aftermarket is usually much more significant for them than for the larger ones. 
 
                                                 
32
 Of course not every single case can be captured by this taxonomy, e.g. a few major state-owned companies 
are still in the preparation phase for privatisation, and thus they are somewhat ‘on the road’ to become A.2 or 
B.2 companies. In other words, their characteristics are rather different compared to a ‘representative’ B.1 firm. 
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Table 13: Outlook for Hungarian suppliers 
Ownership/ 
Type of plant 
Technology Size Activities Markets Outlook Impacts on Domestic R&D 
Green-field plants of car 
manufacturers producing 
components 
(A.1.1) 
Products: mid- or high-
tech, high value-added 
Processes: state-of-the-
art, capital and skill-
intensive, but not 
labour-intensive 
1000-5000 
employees 
specialised in 
automotive 
components 
a single customer, but 
geographically spread 
markets (assembly plants of 
their parent company), 
outputs are exported 
rather stable markets (strong 
commitment from parent companies), 
yet, they depend on overall 
automotive trends and strategic 
moves of parent companies (e.g. 
sourcing, location, R&D) 
major R&D projects conducted by parent 
companies, minor product development 
projects in Hungary when supplying other 
car assemblers in CEE. Audi has set up an 
engine development centre; GM Opel is to 
involve Hungarian R&D units in product 
development. 
Subsidiaries of component 
manufacturers (green- and 
brown-field plants: A1.2, 
A.2) 
Products: typically mid-
tech, some high-tech, 
mid- or high value-
added 
Processes: state-of-the-
art, skill-intensive, less 
capital and more labour-
intensive than for A.1.1 
firms 
from a few 
hundred 
employees to 
over 1000 ones, 
further growth is 
rather likely in 
most cases 
specialised in 
automotive 
components 
a number of customers, the 
vast majority of output is 
exported 
fairly stable business opportunities 
due to the long-established contacts 
between parent companies and 
customers. Although future demand 
is more difficult to forecast, risks can 
be spread more widely. Smaller 
investment compared to A.1.1 cases, 
hence exit might be less costly. 
major R&D projects conducted by parent 
companies, but in-house and extra-mural 
R&D and engineering units have been set 
up, and Hungarian engineers are 
increasingly involved in international R&D 
projects, conducted in various Western 
European countries. 
State-owned companies 
(B.1) 
Products: low-tech, 
some mid-tech, low 
value-added 
Processes: simple 
material processing, 
obsolete, general-
purpose machinery, 
labour-intensive 
up to 1,500-2,000 
employees, 
shrinking 
throughout the 
1990s 
diversified; 
automotive parts 
are of secondary 
importance in the 
case of large, 
multi-plant 
companies 
a number of customers, 
usually 1-2 Western T1- or 
T2 suppliers as well as 
Magyar Suzuki. A 
considerable part of 
automotive output is 
exported. 
rather uncertain, their customers 
might find cheaper suppliers 
hardly any in-house R&D projects or 
demand for extra-mural ones can be 
expected from them 
Privatised former state-
owned companies (B.2) 
Products: mid- or low-
tech, mid-value-added 
Processes: similar to 
B.1 firms, usually less 
obsolete 
medium or large medium-sized 
ones usually 
specialised in 
automotive 
components, 
large ones 
diversified, car 
parts are often of 
secondary 
importance 
similar to B.1 firms slightly more promising than for B.1 
firms (hence privatised). Yet, 
privatisation has been financed 
through loans, and hence debt service 
might threaten their future since 
hardly any profits can be retained for 
badly needed investments. 
some in-house R&D projects or demand for 
extra-mural ones can be expected from them 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
The first theoretical conclusion of the paper is that diffusion models and the notion of sectoral 
system of innovation and production offer a more appropriate conceptual framework to 
capture the actual socio-economic impacts of FDI in transition economies than the generally 
used spillover models. Thus, the former two concepts provide a more relevant guidance for 
both theoretical and policy analyses. The main reasons include that spillover models cannot 
‘tackle’ (i) the fundamental restructuring of practically all sectors (and firms) due to 
privatisation, FDI, technological and organisational innovations, as well as entering new 
markets (losing the former ones); (ii) the nature and dynamics of learning and innovation 
processes, including the importance of co-operation and networking, required by the fact that 
various types of knowledge are needed for a successful innovation process, often possessed 
by different actors. Further, the specific sectoral features of automotive industry are not 
captured, either, in a standard spillover model. 
Second, it is also argued that innovation systems – both sectoral and national ones – in a 
small, open economy are strongly influenced by the strategies of foreign firms operating in 
these host countries. Accordingly, the conceptual framework analysing innovation systems, 
originally developed in the context of large(r), advanced economies, has to be amended to 
grasp the important aspects of internationalisation in this different milieu. Further, 
internationalisation has to be understood in terms of the interplay between national, (multi-
country) regional and global innovation and production systems. Hungary, characterised by 
an almost excessive weight of foreign firms in manufacturing industries either in terms of 
production or exports, can be regarded as a ‘living laboratory’ in this respect. An important 
research question remains, though, namely to disentangle the characteristics of small, open 
economies, in general, and those of small transition countries, in particular. 
Automotive investment activities across borders have significantly intensified in recent 
years in an attempt to cut costs via re-location of production, and to get closer to the ultimate 
customers in emerging markets. Central Europe, the immediate neighbourhood of Hungary is 
no exception either: the region has moved again onto the global stage. Almost all major 
automotive groups have already set up their operations in Central Europe. These intensified 
investment activities have had crucial bearings on the Hungarian automotive industry: after a 
half-a-century interval – imposed by the CMEA-wide division of labour – car production has 
re-emerged in Hungary in the early 1990s. Suppliers have also invested heavily in Hungary. 
Moreover, their motivation has not been simply to follow car assemblers; on the contrary, this 
is only a minor part of the explanation. Their principal reason for setting up subsidiaries – 
either green- or brown-field plants – in Hungary has also been cost-cutting. The only major 
local clients for them are not car assemblers but the engine manufacturing plants of Audi and 
GM Opel; hence the vast majority of their output is exported. 
These strategic moves have radically re-structured the indigenous suppliers, too. Several 
suppliers have been taken over by foreign firms, while others have been integrated into global 
automotive production networks as subcontractors. In both cases new products, processes and 
management techniques have been introduced quite rapidly. Components manufacturing is 
much more important in Hungary than car assembly, even from a somewhat narrow-minded 
macroeconomic point of view: turnover, employment and exports figures are significantly 
larger in the former sector than in the latter. Taking a more general perspective, that is, 
industrial development and competitiveness, suppliers, and particularly the networking 
activities of T1 suppliers, are still more substantial: it is mainly due to them that new 
technologies and organisational innovations are diffusing fast and widely in Hungary. From a 
policy point of view, however, it is necessary to take into account the differences between 
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various types of suppliers. Therefore, a taxonomy has been developed, and applied when 
discussing the prospects for Hungarian companies. 
Notwithstanding the huge importance of foreign firms’ strategies and other aspects of 
globalisation, various elements and dynamics of national innovation systems still do matter. 
Just to highlight one of them, that is, government policies, a major lesson can be drawn by 
comparing general and industry-specific schemes. It is more fruitful to create an attractive, 
favourable environment for R&D and innovation – e.g. by maintaining a sound, well-
performing higher education and research system, providing the necessary physical and 
institutional infrastructure, facilitating industry-academy co-operation and other forms of 
networking – than focusing on the promotion of industry-specific R&D and innovation 
activities. It is also of crucial importance to co-ordinate investment, trade, competition, 
regional development, employment, education and innovation policy aims and tools to 
enhance competitiveness. 
In sum, the successful re-structuring of the Hungarian automotive industry is not only 
due to some ‘push’ factors, i.e. the fierce competition among automotive companies and 
hence the pursuit of cost-cutting via re-location of their production, but it also thanks to ‘pull’ 
factors, i.e. the attractions of the Hungarian economic environment, broadly defined. Given 
the ever changing, and global, nature of the automotive industry, no country can be 
complacent; on the contrary, continuously renewed, concerted efforts and well-devised policy 
measures are needed to achieve further results. 
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